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Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions-Middle Class Panacea or Placebo? Continuing Problems and
Variations on a Theme
Eric A. Lustig*
Today, America faces growing uncertainty about its ability to compete.
The world economy is more interdependent than ever before. If we are
going to continue to compete we have to have a competitive education.
There is no uncertainty in my mind that if you put American workers up
against other workers of the world and they have a level playing field, they
will come off very well. They remain hard, dedicated workers.
But if we are going to continue to keep the standard of living up in this
country and continue to improve it, then we have to improve our
educational standards.
Education remains the key to our nation's future economic prosperity. The
educational opportunities available to future generations are going to
determine the strength of our economy and ultimately whether our nation's
standard of living will rise or fall. Education has always been a top
priority for our country, but now it truly must be a top priority.1
***
We must make the 13th and 14th years of education -- at least two years of
college--just as universal in America by the 21st Century as a high school
education is today, and we must open the doors of college to Americans.
(Applause.) . . . Now, this [tax savings and deduction] plan will give most
families the ability to pay no taxes on money they save for college tuition.
I ask you to pass it--and give every American who works hard the ability
to go to college.2
I. Introduction
When initially drafted, the title of this article was "Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans-Middle Class Panacea or Placebo? Continuing Uncertainty and Variations on a Theme."
In the interim between the original draft and the time of publication, a number of things
occurred which necessitated significant changes to the article.3 Although the new title
merely substitutes the word "problems" for "uncertainty," the underlying message is
perhaps deeper. What were at one time uncertain issues have become more permanent
problems through administrative and legislative action. Another change in the title adds
the education tax provisions proposed by President Clinton and enacted by Congress as
part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. These proposals are driven by much of the same
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forces as those underlying prepaid tuition plans and are considered in that light.
Accordingly, the subject matter presents something of a moving target.
As the American economy matures in the post-cold war era, various forces threaten one
of the fundamental tenets of the "American Dream" -- affordable college education for
America's children.4 College tuition continues to "spiral"5 while federal aid to colleges
and universities decreases drastically as Congress attempts to narrow the once
burgeoning budget deficit on the path toward a balanced budget. Moreover, state colleges
and universities have been similarly affected by comparable budgetary problems at the
state level. The rise in tuition has pressured students and their parents or other
benefactors, as well as colleges and universities and state governments, to seek ways to
alleviate the burden of rising tuition.6 For some time, a number of savings programs have
existed to address this problem at the state and federal levels such as college savings
bond plans and educational savings bonds, respectively. Financing higher education
continues to be a high profile issue as illustrated by the 1996 legislative changes, as well
as President Clinton's education tax incentives which were subsequently enacted in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (the "1997 Act").7
This article addresses the continuing tax issues and policies attendant to one form of
financing the costs of higher education -- prepaid tuition plans. These plans generally
allow one to purchase tuition in advance for future use. One attraction of such a plan is
that the purchaser can lock in tuition at present rates, thus protecting against inflation and
other tuition hikes. Moreover, favorable tax treatment exists as the build up of benefits is
generally tax-free to the purchaser, which provides a significant advantage over other
savings programs. Although prepaid tuition plans have been in existence for a number of
years,8 they have become particularly noteworthy9 in light of three recent developments,
which will be addressed in this article. The first development involves the taxability of
the plan's investment income in light of the recent case, State of Mich. V. United States10
involving the Michigan Education Trust, and holding the trust exempt from tax on its
annual investment income. Although the Sixth Circuit's divided opinion drew strong
criticism, Congress essentially codified the result in new Internal Revenue Code Section
529, as enacted in the Small Business Tax Act of 1996.11
The second issue involves the question of whether the prepaid tuition contracts are
contingent debt obligations, and as such, subject to the original issue discount rules. In
recently promulgated regulations, the Treasury ruled that prepaid tuition plans are not
debt subject to the original issue discount rules.
The final development very much reflects the prevailing political and policy winds
flowing from the first two developments. This last development concerns President
Clinton's recently-enacted education initiatives, which include a higher-education tax
credit and an educational savings account.
This article begins with a background of higher education costs generally, as well as the
tax issues relevant to educational expenses. It then focuses on the tax issues involved
with prepaid tuition plans, particularly the taxability of the plans and the original issue
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discount question. The article examines the State of Mich. V. United States case and new
Section 529 Qualified State Tuition Programs, as well as the 1997 Act education tax
provisions.
From a policy view, the article considers the broader issues of aiming tax incentives at
the middle class and what collateral effects may result. Issues include whether Congress
and the President have succumbed to the politically expedient to the detriment of good
tax policy.
The article concludes that providing tax advantages for prepaid tuition plans is misguided
tax policy disguised as middle-class income relief, and the article proposes that tax
incentives for higher education be made more equitable. In sum, the prepaid tuition plan
tax provisions and other tax incentives are more a middle-class placebo than panacea.
II. Higher Education Costs in General
A. Paying for College
In considering prepaid tuition plans, it is instructive to begin by considering the forces
that created them. As discussed below, the country, particularly the middle class, has
been squeezed by increasing college costs and a poor history of savings. Added to that is
the continuing debate over the use of the tax law to encourage education and savings. As
a result of these pressures, a number of college savings plans and federal tax incentives
have recently emerged.12
1. Spiraling Costs
College costs have spiraled in the last fifteen years or so.13 Higher education costs are
paid for in a limited number of ways. Expenses may be covered by student loans or
financial aid. For example, Pell Grants are need-based financial awards which are limited
in amount.14 Another form of aid is through subsidized student loans under the Stafford
loan program.15 Under this program, the federal government guarantees payment of the
loan and subsidizes the interest payments.16 The guaranteed loan program is need-based
as well.17 Moreover, a student might receive assistance through a scholarship award.
Another form of funding, and perhaps the primary source,18 comes from the savings of
the student's family.
Rising college costs potentially affect the financing of higher education expenses in
several ways. Perhaps the most obvious is to increase family savings for college.19 Other
possibilities include increased financial aid, "income-contingent loan programs," and
controlling costs.20 Of course, a most unpalatable consequence would be that some
students would be precluded from going to college as a result of the higher costs.21 While
these alternatives may all be quite plausible, this article focuses on increasing savings,
particularly through tax incentives.
2. Saving for College
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To what extent should the government, state or federal, encourage saving for college?
That government has a legitimate role to play in improving the
accessibility of higher education is not a claim that needs extended
defense. Even in the narrowest economic terms, an argument can be made
that educational investments generally pay returns more than equal to their
costs, and that without government intervention difficulties in paying for
education would certainly lead to underinvestment by potential students.22
As a starting point, it seems a laudable goal that students and families should save for
college expenses. Yet, lurking beneath this concept are several layers of policy issues that
make it far more problematic. For example, there are "inter-generational" attitudes as to
whether parents or children should bear the responsibility of paying for college.
Moreover, socioeconomic class warfare issues arise with any role to be played by the
government, whether direct or indirect:
On the one hand, parents expect students to be more responsible for their own education;
and taxpayers are increasingly reluctant to finance government efforts to subsidize less
privileged members of society, fearing that the poor may be getting something for
nothing. On the other hand, knowing that subsidies do exist, everyone wants the
opportunity to partake of them. Members of the middle- and upper-middle-class expect
public assistance and feel cheated if it is limited to the "truly needy."23
In addition to the policy issues raised by the question of whether the government should
encourage savings for college are issues of whether such encouragement is at all
effective. This is more complicated by further questions of how families save for college.
The data suggest that little is known as to how much families save for college, although
what information there is suggests that any saving is a modest amount.24 Another issue is
the measurement of savings. For example, should the increase in value of a family's
residence be counted as savings?25 Understanding these savings patterns, to the extent
possible, is necessary for analyzing college savings plans and how much government
should encourage them.
In examining family saving patterns, two problems emerge.26 The first problem, which
generally applies to the middle class, is that families do save, but the assets that represent
savings are not easily converted to pay college expenses.27 For example, a family might
have significant equity in the family house, but is unwilling to sell the house to pay for
college. Of course, the family might be able to borrow against the equity.28 The second
problem, which is more applicable to lower income groups, is simply that many families
are unable to save for any reason.29 Moreover, there is a significant disparity cutting
across racial lines, with African-American and Hispanic households saving substantially
less relative to white families.30
While the data is far from conclusive as to how families save for college, two things seem
abundantly clear and need to be considered in examining the government's role in
sponsoring savings. First, family saving differs markedly among different socioeconomic

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss2/2

4

Lustig: Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions

and ethnic groups. In addition, middle-class families' savings are often invested in nonconvertible assets.
B. Tax Issues in Paying for Higher Education
Saving for and paying college expenses raise several tax issues. The first is whether such
expenditures are deductible, or in other words, subsidized in part by the government
through the reduced tax liability resulting therefrom.31 Historically, such expenditures
were not deductible.32 Another issue concerns the taxability of financial aid and
scholarship awards. To the extent that financial aid represents a student loan, such loan is
tax neutral. A scholarship is generally includible, unless it meets certain statutory criteria.
The final issue involves the tax consequences related to various college savings plans.
The tax incentives associated with savings plans are particularly important given the
general non-deductibility of educational expenses.
1. Deductibility of Higher Education Expenses
Historically, the cost of tuition and other expenses of higher education have generally not
been deductible under the tax law.33 This non-deductibility was based on treatment as
personal expenses,34 as opposed to business-related expenses. 35 Alternatively, education
expenses were viewed as non-deductible capital expenditures.36
In limited circumstances, however, deductions for educational expenses were allowed.
Under Treasury Regulations, deductions are allowed for educational expenditures that
either maintain or improve skills required in the taxpayer's employment or meet the
express requirements of the individual’s employer or applicable law.37 Deductible
expenditures may not, however, fall within either of two negative provisions. Thus, even
if an expenditure maintains or improves skills, a deduction is not allowed if the
expenditure "meets the minimum educational requirements for qualification in the
[taxpayer's] employment or other trade or business."38 Neither is a deduction allowed to
the extent an expenditure qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business.39
Accordingly, college expenses leading to a bachelor's degree were generally not
deductible because they either meet the student's minimum job requirements or qualify
her for a new trade or business.
The non-deductibility of educational expenditures has attracted substantial criticism by
those who argue that higher education expenditures should be capitalized and recovered
through amortization deductions.40 As discussed in Part II of this article, limited credit is
now provided under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.41
2. Taxation of Scholarship Awards
The Code excludes certain scholarships from income.42 Prior to 1986, the rules were far
more liberal.43 As a result of the base broadening provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, the rules were tightened so that only payment for tuition, fees, and required books
paid to qualified candidates are excluded.44
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3. Taxation of Student Loans
The recipient of a loan does not realize income for tax purposes because there has been
no accession to wealth as there is a corresponding obligation to repay the loan.45 Thus,
when a student receives a student loan there are no tax consequences upon receipt. Upon
repayment of the principal amount of the loan, there are also no tax consequences to the
student.46 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, the interest portion was
generally deductible under Section 163(a). Currently, no deduction for personal or
consumer interest is allowed.47
One exception to the general non-deductibility of personal interest survived the 1986
changes. Where a taxpayer refinances his or her principal residence, interest on such debt
is deductible.48 Thus, a taxpayer who refinances his or her house to pay for college costs,
is able to deduct interest on the repayment of the debt.49 As discussed in Part IV of this
article, Congress restored a limited deduction for interest on student loans.50
4. Tax Incentives to Promote Saving for College
When prepaid tuition plans were created, tax incentives already existed for financing
higher education expenses. At the federal level, for example, income from redemption of
certain savings bonds is exempt if used for "qualified higher education expenses."51
The rising cost of a college education has pressured many Americans, particularly those
in the middle class. Escalating tuition has been exacerbated by the fact that Americans
have historically had problems saving for college. The growing pressure has resulted in
the creation of state prepaid tuition plans as well as limited tax incentives for college
savings.
III. Prepaid Tuition Plans--Operation and Taxation
A. Prepaid Plans in General
1. Background and Types of Plans
State prepaid tuition plans allow one party, generally the beneficiary's parent, relative or
friend, to purchase tuition benefits for the beneficiary.52 Although the various plans differ
somewhat, they generally follow one of three models.53 The first model follows the
Michigan plan.54 Under this model, the purchaser contracts to buy a "predetermined
amount and type of tuition benefits,"55 such as a number of years tuition at a state
community college or university. For example, one might purchase a prepaid tuition
contract for four years at state university. The purchase price would depend on the age of
the beneficiary at the time of the transaction. The older the beneficiary, the higher the
cost, and the younger the beneficiary, the lower the cost.56
Another model follows the Ohio plan.57 The Ohio model allows a purchaser to open a
prepaid tuition account with an initial minimum purchase.58 Additional tuition benefits
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may be purchased incrementally in units of credit hours or smaller.59 Unlike the Florida
model, in which the price of the plan varies with the beneficiary's age, the price of the
Ohio model does not.60
2. The Massachusetts Twist--The U.Plan
The third, and newest, form of prepaid tuition plan is the Massachusetts "U. Plan." The
U. Plan differs from the Florida and Ohio models in several ways. The first difference
concerns its form. Purchasers buy a "tuition certificate" which is based on general state
obligation bonds. The tuition certificates are redeemable against tuition at any of the
participating institutions. The tuition certificate represents a percentage of a year's tuition
at one of the participating institutions fixed at the date of purchase. Another difference is
that the Massachusetts plan is applicable at a wide variety of institutions, public and
private alike.61
The Massachusetts U.Plan represents a relatively new twist on the standard prepaid
tuition plan. The U.Plan began operations in 1995 under the auspices of the
Massachusetts Educational Financing Authority ("MEFA") as a way to assist workingclass and middle-class families save for college.62
Under the plan, participants purchase tuition certificates, the proceeds from which are
invested in state bonds.63 The tuition certificate is purchased in a denomination of at least
$300. The purchaser must also designate a maturity date. Under the plan, the holder of a
certificate may redeem it for a predetermined percentage of tuition and mandatory fees at
a participating institution.64
Thus, for example, purchaser buys a $1,000 tuition certificate today for a maturity date of
2016. If the $1,000 represents 5 percent of the present tuition of $20,000 at college A and
10 percent of the present tuition of $10,000 at college B, then the holder of the certificate
may use the certificate in 2016 to pay 5 percent of the tuition at college A and 10 percent
at college B, even if tuition at that point is $50,000 at each institution. In the unlikely
event that the tuition has not increased in that time period, or if the holder does not go to
college, the certificate may be redeemed for the principal amount plus a return based on
the compounded annual increase in the Consumer Price Index ("CPI").65 When the
certificate is redeemed for tuition, the participating institution receives the underlying
state bond plus a return of the CPI plus two points.66 Thus, the risk of investment, as to
the CPI plus two points, is borne by the Commonwealth and backed by its full faith and
credit.67 The risk of tuition increases beyond the CPI plus two points, however, is borne
by the institution.
Participants sign up during the annual enrollment period, which is March 1 through April
30. There is a one-time processing fee of $25, and a processing fee of 1 percent of the
purchase price of the tuition certificate. Participation in the plan is sold through the
branches of Fleet Bank, a large New England bank.68 The plan boasts and impressive
number and variety of participating institutions.69 Moreover, the plan is financially
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accessible, with a minimum investment of $300, lump sum or in monthly payments of
$25.70
To date, the U.Plan has been quite popular. In 1995, its first year of operation, over
28,700 participants enrolled and $26 million of bonds were purchased.71 The average
purchase was for $1,600.72
The tuition certificates, underlying bonds and income derived therefrom is exempt from
state taxation imposed in Massachusetts.73 The federal tax treatment was somewhat less
certain as the offering materials state: "The Program is unique in its structure and
therefore there is a lesser degree of certainty about its federal income tax consequences
than is ordinarily the case in Commonwealth bonds."74
B. Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans
Apart from the tuition guarantee, prepaid tuition plans originally relied on favorable tax
treatment in order to be competitive with other forms of college savings. The expected
favorable tax treatment allowed the prepaid tuition plans to have lower investment returns
in order to result in a competitive after-tax return.75 This section of the article examines
these tax issues. First, the article discusses how the investment income of the plan is
taxed. This issue is first addressed under the law prior to Section 529 and then addressed
under that section. Also considered is the taxation to the beneficiary of the plan. The
article then addresses whether the prepaid tuition investment is a contingent debt
obligation subject to the original issue discount rules.
1. Pre-Section 529 Treatment --State of Mich. v. United States
Although the taxation of prepaid tuition plans is now largely controlled by the provisions
of Code Section 529 Qualified State Tuition Programs, it is helpful to first examine the
developments leading up to the enactment of Section 529. That section essentially
codified the holding in State of Mich. v. United States.76
Initially there were thought to be three potential sources for exempting or excluding from
tax the income earned by prepaid tuition plans. First, the Internal Revenue Code does not
apply to states qua states.77 In addition, income from any state or political subdivision is
excluded from federal income tax.78 Also potentially applicable is the exemption from
income tax for tax exempt educational organizations.79
The only prepaid tuition tax case to date was decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.80 Because the Michigan plan was the prototype program
and, more importantly, because of its status as the only decided case, it provides a good
vehicle through which to examine the tax issues relevant to prepaid tuition plans.
In State of Mich. v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that the state-sponsored prepaid
tuition plan, the Michigan Education Trust ("M.E.T.") was not taxable on the income
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earned by the trust.81 Accordingly, the yearly investment build-up in the plan is not
taxable.
The M.E.T. resulted from pressure placed on the state government to provide assistance
to help parents pay for their children's educations.82 Michigan has long made education a
fundamental principle of state government.83 The Michigan legislature created the M.E.T.
in 1986 as a "public body corporate and politic."84 In the enacting legislation, the
legislature proclaimed the following purposes for the act:
(a) To encourage education and the means of education.
(b) To maintain state institutions of higher education by helping to provide
a stable financial base to these institutions.
(c) To provide wide and affordable access to state institutions of higher
education for the residents of this state.
(d) To encourage attendance at state institutions of higher education.
(e) To provide students and their parents economic protection against
rising tuition costs.
(f) To provide students and their parents financing assistance for
postsecondary education at a Michigan institution of higher education of
their choice.
(g) To help provide the benefits of higher education to the people of this
state.
(h) To encourage elementary and secondary students in this state to
achieve high standards of performance.85
Under the plan, the M.E.T. and party paying on behalf of the beneficiary entered into an
"advance tuition payment" contract.86 The contract provided that the purchaser pay a sum
based on "various actuarial assumptions and forecasts," in return for which the M.E.T. is
obligated "to pay the beneficiary's full tuition cost, whatever that cost turns out to be."87
The plan also provided for refunds in the event that the beneficiary decides either to
attend a private college or not attend college at all.88
The Michigan Educational Trust Act also required that certain regulatory steps be taken
prior to the sale of any contracts. Accordingly, the M.E.T.'s status under the federal
securities law was required to be determined.89 Moreover, the act required that the M.E.T.
receive a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that the trust's income be tax-free to
the purchaser:
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An advance tuition payment contract shall not be entered into by the trust
until the internal revenue service has issued a favorable ruling or opinion
that the purchaser of the advance payment contract will not be considered
actually or constructively to be in receipt of income.90

The M.E.T. received a "no action" letter from the Securities Exchange Commission
ruling that the M.E.T.'s contracts, if securities, would be exempt from registration under
federal securities law.91 The tax ruling, however, proved to be far more problematic. The
Michigan State Treasurer requested a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") as
to whether the M.E.T.'s annual income was excluded from tax under Section 115 of the
Internal Revenue Code, as well as the tax treatment to the beneficiary upon receipt of the
benefits.92 The IRS ruled that the M.E.T. was not an integral part of the State of
Michigan93 because it operated independently of the state and the M.E.T.'s funds were
not subject to the claims of Michigan's creditors, nor were the funds considered cash of
the state.94 In addition, the IRS ruled that M.E.T.'s income was not excluded under
Section 115(1) because it benefitted the private interests of its beneficiaries.
Changing its course, the M.E.T. applied to the IRS for tax exempt status under Section
501(c)(3).95 The IRS subsequently denied the M.E.T.'s application,96 at which time the
M.E.T. paid income tax for 1989 and claimed a refund from the IRS. After the IRS
allowed the claim to lapse, the M.E.T. followed the prescribed procedures and filed a suit
for refund of income taxes in United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan.97 The M.E.T. argued the same issues that it did in its ruling request; namely,
that the Internal Revenue Code did not apply to it because the trust was part of the State
of Michigan, and in the alternative, that Section 115(1) excluded M.E.T.'s income from
tax.98 In addition, the M.E.T. raised a number of constitutional arguments.99
The district court held against the M.E.T. concluding the trust was taxable.100 The court
rejected the M.E.T.'s argument that it was not subject to the Code because the trust was
not an "integral part of the State of Michigan."101 Specifically, the court held this because
Michigan could not use the M.E.T.'s funds to pay the state's creditors, nor were the
M.E.T.'s contracts backed with Michigan's full faith and credit.102 The court similarly
dismissed the trust's claim that Section 115(1) excluded the M.E.T.'s income from tax
because the income did not accrue to the State of Michigan:103
Income "accrues" to a state for purposes of Section 115 when some kind
of actual or bookkeeping transfer of funds occurs. That is, a state or
political subdivision of a state must have a "vested right" or an
"enforceable claim" to the income.104
Because Michigan had no claim to the trust's assets or investment income, the income did
not accrue to the state within the scope of Section 115(1).105
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The M.E.T.'s argument that it was a tax-exempt organization under either Section
501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4)106 was also dismissed by the district court. An organization's taxexempt status will be lost if there is any "substantial non-exempt purpose."107 The court
rejected the trust's position that the benefits to the purchasers of the M.E.T. contracts
were "incidental to the broader benefits gained by society at large in the form of a welleducated populace."108 Rather, the court held that the tuition guarantee was a "substantial
private purpose," which destroyed the trust's tax exemption.109
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.110 The Sixth Circuit
held that the M.E.T. was an integral part of the State of Michigan and accordingly, not
subject to the Internal Revenue Code.111 Accordingly, the court did not reach the trust's
alternative arguments as to Sections 115(1), 501(c)(3), and 501(c)(4).112 The Sixth Circuit
found error in the district court's finding that the M.E.T. was not an integral part of the
State of Michigan or political subdivision thereof.113 The court liberally applied a broad
construction of the term "political subdivision" from Section 103, 114 which generally
excludes from income interest from state and local obligations:
The term "political subdivision" is broad and comprehensive and denotes
any division of the State made by the proper authorities thereof, acting
within their constitutional powers, for the purpose of carrying out a
portion of those functions of the State which by long usage and inherent
necessities of government have always been regarded as public.115
The Sixth Circuit loosely interpreted this test as requiring that the "‘activities of the
subdivision were for a public purpose.’"116 The court reasoned that encouraging higher
education clearly was a public function.117 In sum, the court viewed the issue as one
better left to Congress, "[w]e conclude that while Congress could, if it wished, tax the
investment income of state agencies such as the education trust, it has not chosen to do
so."118
In a strong dissent, Judge Guy agreed with the district court. Judge Guy began his dissent
noting the extremely political tone of both the M.E.T. and the case:
I also would place more of a political overlay on the analysis of these
issues than does the [majority]. However well intentioned it may sound to
put into a place a program guaranteeing parents affordable college tuition
in the future for their children, the engine driving this program was in no
small degree plain old partisan politics. Fifty-five thousand persons signed
up for this program, and I assume that most of them were registered
voters.119
Moreover, Judge Guy acknowledged the fiscal problems of the M.E.T. and the
importance of a victory for the trust, which had stopped accepting applications two years
after its start:
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Parents who signed a contract with MET essentially were buying an
annuity. They would put "X" dollars up front, and over time the interest
earned would allow the fund to grow and keep pace with projected
increases in college tuition. If it was this simple, why didn't parents just
buy an annuity on the open market to accomplish the same result? The
answer is that no private company could offer an annuity at the attractive
price at which it was being offered by MET. MET was able to undercut
the market for two reasons. First, in my view, MET proceeded
imprudently on the assumption that its earnings would continue at the
abnormally high rate that State investments had been earning. Second,
unlike a private company, MET had the luxury of underestimating the rate
of future tuition increases.
....
Although the [MET's] shortfall was primarily the result of less return on
investment than anticipated and greater increases in tuition than
contemplated, nothing could be done about these two factors. The only
adjustment that hopefully could be made was to secure tax-exempt status,
notwithstanding that MET had been told from the start by the IRS that it
would not qualify for tax-exempt status, a ruling MET accepted. MET was
forced by financial pressure to revisit this issue, however, and instituted
this lawsuit.120
As to substantive issues, Judge Guy pointed out that determining whether an entity is an
"integral part" of a state depended on a six-part test:
(1) whether it is used for a governmental purpose and performs a
governmental function; (2) whether performance of its function is on
behalf of one or more states or political subdivisions; (3) whether there are
any private interests involved, or whether the states or political
subdivisions involved have the powers and interests of an owner; (4)
whether control and supervision of the organization is vested in public
authority or authorities; (5) if express or implied statutory or other
authority is necessary for the creation and/or use of such an
instrumentality, and whether such authority exists; and (6) the degree of
financial autonomy and the source of its operating expenses.121
While the M.E.T. had an undeniable connection with the state because it was created by
Michigan and its board members were selected by the governor, in Judge Guy's opinion,
it was not an integral function of the state.122 The M.E.T. at a minimum failed to meet
requirements (3), (4) and (6) because the purchasers' substantial private interests were
involved as a result of the beneficiaries' receiving the benefit of prepaid guaranteed
tuition.123 Moreover, as an independent entity, the M.E.T. was not controlled or
supervised by the state.124 In addition, the M.E.T. was financially "autonomous" from the

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss2/2

12

Lustig: Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions

state because the trust's funds were not commingled with the state's other funds and thus
not subject to being "raided" for state shortfalls.125
Judge Guy also rejected the M.E.T.'s assertion that its income was excluded from tax
under Section 115(1).126 The distinction, in Judge Guy's opinion, was between essential
governmental function and those of a private character.127 Although in agreement with
the district court's holding that the Section 115(1) was not applicable because the trust's
income did not accrue to the state, Judge Guy also challenged whether the M.E.T.
performed an essential government function. While not disputing that higher education
was an essential government function to the state of Michigan, Judge Guy noted that
providing tuition prepayment programs to those able to afford it was not necessarily an
essential government function.128 To the contrary, Judge Guy argued, the M.E.T. engaged
in the function of investing money, a "quintessentially private function."129 Judge Guy
rejected the trust's argument, in part, because the state did not put its full faith and credit
behind the program:
I might take this argument more seriously if the State pledged its full faith
and credit to the MET program, because then the State would suffer direct
and measurable harm if the program failed. The state provides no such
guarantee, however. Instead, the legislature at its discretion can decide to
bail out the Trust if it becomes actuarially unsound. Thus, MET's pledge
to purchasers is chimerical. It is not bottomed on any state guarantee, but
rather on wise investment strategies and the correctness of its financial
assumptions to ensure the continued soundness of its guarantee.130
2. State of Mich. v. United States Aftermath--Section 529 Qualified State Tuition
Programs
a. Congressional Action--The End of Uncertainty
Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit's decision in State of Mich. v. United States, a great
degree of uncertainty existed as to the taxation of prepaid tuition plans. The reasoning of
the divided Sixth Circuit Court drew criticism,131 although the Solicitor General's office
declined to appeal the case to the Supreme Court.132 Moreover, the IRS refused to issue
rulings in a number of requests submitted by various plans,133 and eventually announced
a no-ruling policy while it further studied prepaid tuition plans.134
Administrative uncertainty yielded to legislative action as the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996 was amended to exempt state tuition plans from tax:
The [Senate Finance] Committee believes that it is appropriate to clarify
the tax treatment of State-sponsored prepaid tuition and educational
savings programs in order to encourage persons to save to meet postsecondary educational expenses.135
President Clinton subsequently signed the bill into law.136

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 31 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 2

b. New Section 529
Code Section 529 establishes a new type of entity exempt from taxation--the Qualified
State Tuition Program. In addition, Section 529 creates a complex statutory scheme
implementing the exemption.
A Qualified State Tuition Program is exempt from income taxes, although it is subject to
the unrelated business income tax.137 Section 529(b) defines Qualified State Tuition
Program as follows:
Qualified State tuition program. For purposes of this section-(1) In general. The term "qualified State tuition program" means a
program established and maintained by a State or agency or
instrumentality thereof-(A) under which a person-(i) may purchase tuition credits or
certificates on behalf of a designated
beneficiary which entitle the beneficiary to
the waiver or payment of qualified higher
education expenses of the beneficiary, or
(ii) may make contributions to an account
which is established for the purpose of
meeting the qualified higher education
expenses of the designated beneficiary of the
account, and
(B) which meets the other requirements of this
subsection.138
Qualified higher education expenses are defined as follows:
(3) Qualified higher education expenses. The term
"qualified higher education expenses" means tuition, fees,
books, supplies, and equipment required for the enrollment
or attendance of a designated beneficiary at an eligible
educational institution.139
In addition to the general definitions, the new section provides a number of operating
rules which must also be met. First, contributions to the program may be made only in
cash.140 Moreover, neither the contributor nor the beneficiary may direct the investment
decision of the trust.141 Additionally, an interest in a Qualified State Tuition Program may
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not be pledged as security for a loan.142 Furthermore, the program must set forth a
separate accounting for each beneficiary.143
Because of the obvious temptation for abuse of the tax exemption, Section 529 also
provides measures to guard against overfunding the program. Thus, a Qualified State
Tuition Program must provide "adequate safeguards to prevent contributions on behalf of
a designated beneficiary in excess of those necessary to provide for the qualified higher
education expenses of the beneficiary."144 Furthermore, a Qualified State Tuition
Program must provide a "more than de minimis penalty" on refunds of benefits not
used.145
Section 529 also imposes a reporting responsibility on Qualified State Tuition Programs
by requiring them to report distributions.146
c. Tax Consequences to the Beneficiaries of Prepaid Tuition Plans
Section 529 essentially codifies the holding of State of Mich. v. United States by
providing that neither the contributor nor the beneficiary is taxed on the annual earnings
of the plan.147 Moreover, a contribution to the plan is not considered to be a taxable gift
to the beneficiary.148
Upon distribution, the beneficiary is taxed in the same manner as an annuitant receiving a
benefit under Section 72:
Distributions. (A) In general. Any distribution under a State qualified State
tuition program shall be includible in the gross income of the distributee in
the manner as provided under section 72 to the extent not included from
gross income under any other provision of this chapter.
(B) In-kind distributions. Any benefit furnished to a
designated beneficiary under a qualified State tuition
program shall be treated as a distribution to the beneficiary.
....
(D) Operating rules. For purposes of applying section 72-(i) to the extent provided by the Secretary,
all qualified State tuition programs of which
an individual is a designated beneficiary
shall be treated as one program.
(ii) all distributions during a taxable year
shall be treated as one distribution, and
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(iii) the value of the contract, income on the
contract, and investment in the contract shall
be computed as of the close of the calendar
year in which the taxable year begins.149
The annuity rules generally require that an annuitant allocate annuity payments between
income and recovery of basis or investment.150 This is generally done based on a pro-rata
allocation of the investment over the amount expected to be recovered, according to
mortality tables published in the regulations. Accordingly, the beneficiary of a prepaid
tuition plan is taxed on the difference between the value of the benefits received and the
allocable cost of the plan to the purchaser.
C. Applicability of Original Issue Discount Rules
Another tax issue that was unresolved until recently was whether prepaid tuition plans are
subject to the original issue discount rules of the Code.
1. Time Value of Money Rules in General
The Code recognizes conceptually that the use of money has value.151 These rules fall
within the umbrella of the original issue discount ("OID") rules. The OID rules
essentially seek to recast the transaction by imputing interest when none is expressly
provided. For example, assume that corporation A issues for $1,000 a ten-year bond with
a face value of $1,000 bearing a 9 percent interest rate, payable semi-annually.
Accordingly, corporation A pays $450 to the bondholders twice a year. The bondholders
must include these payments as interest income.152 Assume further that instead of bearing
interest, the bond is issued with no explicit interest rate. This type of bond is often
referred to as a "zero-coupon bond."153 Obviously, no rational purchaser would pay
$1,000 for the bond. Rather, the purchaser would demand to be compensated in some
form for the use of her money over the ten-year term of the note. Assuming that the
prevailing market rate for a bond such as corporation A's is 9 percent (compounded semiannually), a willing buyer would purchase the bond for $415, which is the present value
of $1,000 payable in ten years, with a 9 percent discount rate compounded semiannually.154 Thus, if the purchaser deposited the $415 in a bank account paying 9 percent
interest (compounded semi-annually), the purchaser would receive an interest payment of
$18.67 ($415.00 x 4.5%) after six months. Assuming that the purchaser adds the interest
payment to the savings deposit, the next interest payment would be $19.51 (($415.00 +
$18.67) x 4.5%). The account would grow to $1,000 after ten years.155 Economically, the
difference between the $1,000 face value and the $415 present value represents interest.
The OID rules aim to recast transactions to adequately reflect the impact of the time
value of money.
The OID rules require, inter alia, that the holder of a "debt instrument" having original
issue discount include an amount allocated for each day of the taxable year, thereby
allocating the OID over the term of the instrument.156 The Code defines "original issue
discount" as "the excess (if any) of the stated redemption price at maturity, over the issue
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price."157 The issue price is generally the amount paid for the instrument.158 The "stated
redemption price at maturity" basically is the amount to be paid at the end of the
instrument's term.159
2. Are Prepaid Tuition Plans Debt Instruments Subject to the OID Rules?
Until recently, it was unclear whether prepaid tuition plans were subject to the OID rules.
Notwithstanding the outcome of State of Mich. v. United States if the plans were subject
to the OID rules, the annual difference between the face value of the interests in the plan
(presumably the amount that would be available for tuition) and the present value of the
payments would be potentially subject to tax. This issue turns on whether a prepaid
tuition plan interest is a debt instrument for purposes of the OID rules.
The Code very generally defines a debt instrument for purposes of the OID rules as "a
bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness."160 The
regulations further expand on this by defining a debt instrument as "any instrument or
contractual arrangement that constitutes indebtedness under general principles of Federal
income tax law (including, for example, a certificate of deposit or loan)."161 The proposed
regulations provided for OID treatment with respect to "contingent" payments.162 Under
the proposed regulations, interest income, including OID, on contingent payment debt
instruments, must be determined by the "noncontingent bond method," which generally
requires that a projected schedule be developed, which includes all payments, contingent
and noncontingent. The excess of the payments over the issue price is OID.163
Early comments by the Treasury Department indicated that it was considering including
prepaid tuition plans within the scope of the contingent debt proposed regulations. The
issue evolved into a lobbying battle between the state prepaid tuition plans and the
College Savings Bank of Princeton, New Jersey, the sellers of the "College Sure CD"
college savings plan, which is a private plan subject to the OID rules and accordingly
does not provide any tax advantages to its holders.
The state prepaid plans argued that they should not subject to the contingent debt
proposed regulations because they are providing an educational service contract rather
than a debt instrument.164 The College Savings Bank, on the other hand, asserted that the
prepaid plans are simple investment devices, which are similar to other debt instruments
and as such, are subject to the contingent debt proposed regulations.165
In June of 1996, the final regulations on contingent debt obligations were promulgated.
The final regulations resolved any past uncertainty in favor of the state tuition plans. The
regulations expressly excepted prepaid tuition plans from OID treatment. Indeed, even if
prepaid tuition plans are considered to be debt contracts, the regulations specifically do
not apply.166
With the enactment of Section 529 Qualified State Tuition Program and the Treasury's
promulgation of the final contingent debt obligation regulations, much of the uncertainty
previously surrounding prepaid tuition plans has disappeared. The annual build-up of
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investment income to the plan is generally exempt from tax, and the beneficiary will
include income in the year tuition benefits are received measured as the difference
between the value of those benefits and their cost. In addition, the OID rules are generally
not applicable to prepaid tuition plans, so that the ultimate difference between the value
and cost is deferred until that point when the benefits are used.
Perhaps not unexpectedly, given the lowering of the various hurdles, states have
responded positively to the end of the tax uncertainty--thirty-two states are at some stage
of planning, developing or considering prepaid tuition plans.167
IV. The 1997 Act Education Tax Provisions
Close on the heels of the enactment of Section 529 Qualified State Tuition Programs,
President Clinton renewed his education tax proposals, specifically targeting the middle
class:
Well educated workers are essential to an economy experiencing
technological change and facing global competition. The Administration
believes that reducing the after-tax cost of education for tax credits and
deductions will encourage investment in education and training while
lowering tax burdens on middle-income taxpayers.
The expenses of higher education place a significant burden on many
middle-class families. Grants and subsidized loans are available to
students for low- and moderate-income families; high-income families can
afford the cost of higher education. The combination of Federal grants and
a tax credit reduces the after-tax cost of higher education expenses by
reducing the after-tax cost of higher education. This guarantee will help
make 14 years of education the norm in America.168
To the extent that the President's proposals continued the theme of middle class tax relief
for education incentives, they are similar to prepaid tuition plans. Moreover, prepaid
tuition plans and the President's proposals share much of the same underlying policy.
The President's proposals included a non-refundable tax credit and a deduction for
qualified higher education expenses. Moreover, the President proposed a number of other
educational initiatives that affect the financing of higher education including: tax
incentives for expansion of student loan forgiveness;169 an extended exclusion for
employer-provided educational tax credit; and expanded individual retirement
accounts.170
Republican support for President Clinton's proposals was warm, as reflected in the
following comment: "The principle of using the tax code to help provide for affordable
educational opportunity represents common ground, but I await [the President's] reply in
order to evaluate the merits of this particular tax proposal."171
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It was further suggested that the President would be willing to give the Republican
Congressional leadership preferential capital gains treatment in exchange for educational
tax incentives:
So a capital gains-cut-for-tuition-tax-breaks deal would be great politics.
The Republicans get the relief for capital gains that they have so
passionately longed for and were so close to getting in 1989, 1992, and
1995. Clinton gets to be the "Education President." And lobbyists and the
rank-and-file members of Congress get a big tax bill to serve as the
vehicle for dozens of small vehicles.172
Ultimately, that is exactly what happened. While the President's proposals were
politically attractive, as will be discussed in the next part of the article, it remains to be
seen whether they are sound from a policy perspective.
A. The Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 created new Code Section 25A, which provides a tax
credit consisting of the Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit.173
Both of these credits are subject to limitations as to amount and other qualifications. The
Hope Scholarship Credit is based on a program organized by the State of Georgia.174 The
Hope Scholarship Credit consists of the sum of: (a) all of the "qualified tuition and
related expenses" paid during the taxable year up to $1,000; plus (b) fifty percent of
expenses over $1,000 but less than the "applicable limit."175 Qualified tuition and related
expenses include all those required for attendance or enrollment at an educational
institution except for education relating to sports, games or hobbies.176 The applicable
limit is one-hundred percent of the qualified tuition and related expenses paid up to
$1,000.177 Thus, in effect, the Hope Scholarship Credit is limited to $1,500 per year.
In addition to the above limits on amounts, the Hope Scholarship Credit is only
applicable for two years.178 Moreover, Section 25A(b)(2) limits the Hope Scholarship
Credit to students in their first two years of postsecondary education.179 Furthermore, the
credit is only available to at least half-time students.180 Finally, the credit is not available
to students who have been "convicted of a Federal or State felony offense consisting of
the possession or distribution of a controlled substance."181
In addition to the Hope Scholarship Credit, the 1997 Act provided for a Lifetime
Learning Credit.182 The Lifetime Learning Credit reflects President Clinton's proposed
tax relief for education and job training expenses.183 That credit is an amount equal to
twenty percent of the qualified tuition and related expenses paid by the taxpayer and not
in excess of $10,000.184 Eligible qualified tuition and related expenses include those
"with respect to any course of instruction at an eligible educational institution to acquire
or improve job skills of the individual."185
Coordination between the Lifetime Learning Credit and the Hope Scholarship Credit is
provided by reducing the eligible qualified tuition and related expenses by that amount
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taken. The Lifetime Learning Credit is otherwise subject to the same limitations as
applicable to the Hope Scholarship Credit. For purposes of determining both the Hope
Scholarship and Lifetime Learning Credit, qualified tuition and related expenses are
further reduced by scholarships received (which are excludable under Section 117) as
well as other financial aid received.186 The Hope Scholarship Credit and Lifetime
Learning Credit are phased out for higher income taxpayers as the credit starts to be
reduced for those taxpayers whose modified adjusted gross incomes exceed $40,000
($80,000 for taxpayers filing married filing jointly).187
B. Other Education Tax Provisions
In addition to the tuition credit and education and job training deduction discussed above,
President Clinton also proposed several other education tax incentives, including the
expansion of the exclusion for forgiveness of certain student loans. At the time of the
proposal, Section 108(f) generally excluded from tax188 forgiveness of student loans by
the federal, state or local government, or public benefit corporation with control over a
government hospital provided that the loan forgiveness is "contingent" upon the student's
working certain jobs for a certain period.189 The proposal expanded the exclusion beyond
loans by governmental or quasi-governmental agencies to loans extended by "nonprofit
tax-exempt charitable or educational institutions to their students or graduates when the
proceeds are to be used to repay outstanding student loans, provided the loan forgiveness
is contingent on the student's working for a certain period of time in certain professions
for any broad class of employers."190
The President has also proposed expanding the eligibility for deductible individual
retirement accounts ("IRAs"). IRAs are tax favored investment vehicles for two reasons.
First, contributions to the account may be deductible.191 Second, the IRA is exempt from
tax on its annual investment income.192 The income earned is taxed upon withdrawal,
which generally must begin by age 70 1/2.193 Moreover, withdrawals before age 59 1/2
are generally penalized by a ten-percent excise tax (in addition to the tax on the
income).194 The President first proposed expanding the income thresholds and phaseouts
for IRA deductions, thus making more taxpayers eligible for deduction.195 In addition, the
proposals called for establishing a "Special IRA," to which contributions would be nondeductible, but the earnings would be accumulate tax-free.196 Most significantly,
withdrawals from the "special IRA" would be allowed, without imposition of the tenpercent excise tax, as long as the proceeds are used for certain purposes, which are
defined to include education expenses.197
The 1997 Act established a new "Education Individual Retirement Account,"198 which
provides yet another incentive for middle-class taxpayers to save for college. Under
Section 530, an educational retirement account is generally exempt from income tax.199
Such an account is a "trust created or organized in the United States exclusively for the
purpose of paying the qualified higher education expenses of the designated beneficiary
of the trust," provided certain other requirements are met.200 In order to qualify as an
educational retirement account, the annual contributions may not exceed $500. The
exemption from tax effectively allows the account to grow more rapidly than investments
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subject to annual income tax. In addition, withdrawals are not taxed to the extent that
they are used to pay the qualified higher education expenses of the designated
beneficiary.201 The 1997 Act also generally provided for penalty-free withdrawal from
IRAs for qualified higher education expenses.202
The 1997 Act also brought back a limited above the line deduction for interest on any
qualified education loan.203 The deductible amount is capped at $2,500 after a four year
phase-in.204 The deduction begins to phase out as a taypayer’s adjusted gross income
exceeds $40,000 ($60,000 for joint returns).205 Another limitation restricts the deduction
to interest paid "during the first 60 months . . . in which interest payments are
required."206 Moreover, the 1997 Act provided for expanded tax-free forgiveness of
student loans under certain circumstances.207
C. Increased Financial Aid
In addition to the foregoing tax incentives, President Clinton proposed the "largest
increase in Pell Grant Scholarships in 20 years."208
V. Prepaid Tuition Plans, Qualified State Tuition Programs and the 1997 Education
Tax Provisions--Middle-Class Panacea or Placebo?
Although the uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of prepaid tuition plans has
subsided, several broader issues emerge. To the extent that prepaid tuition plans and
President Clinton's recently-enacted education tax provisions are intended to encourage
the middle class to save for college they shall be considered as a whole. Moreover, they
raise a number of policy concerns. First and foremost, the plans raise equity concerns.
A. Tax Policy Issues
For tax policy purposes, taxes are evaluated on the basis of three goals: equity, efficiency
and simplicity.209 The goal of equity relates to fairness and is critical to our voluntary tax
system.210 Equity is further divided into components of horizontal equity and vertical
equity. "The traditional test of fairness in the distribution of tax burdens consists of two
principles: Persons who are similarly situated should be treated equally ('horizontal
equity'), and there should be appropriate differentiations between persons on each income
level and those on the levels above and below ('vertical equity')."211 Accordingly, tax
laws should be equitable to taxpayers who are similarly situated as well as equitable
between taxpayers at different economic levels.
Efficiency, or neutrality, goes to the effect of the tax on the economy or market:
The efficiency criterion requires that the tax interfere as a little as possible
with people's economic behavior. The benchmark for this analysis is
typically the allocation of goods and services that would occur in a market
economy in the absence of taxes and that would presumably produce the
greater consumer satisfaction. The ability of the economy to satisfy
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consumer demands is therefore reduced where taxes change the incentives
to engage in various activities (such as work, investment or consumption)
relative to what they would be in an economy without taxes. The
efficiency criterion, like the equity criterion, generally implies uniform
treatment of all sources and uses of income.212
Clearly, all forms of taxation will necessarily have some effect on economic efficiency.
Indeed, the more the Code is used to further non-revenue based policy concerns, the less
efficient it is.213
Finally, the third goal of simplicity is not so much a separate and distinct goal as a
product of achieving the first two goals of equity and efficiency.
Simplicity is often viewed not as a separate norm but as a feature of any
tax system that is both equitable and efficient. For example, complex tax
rules are inefficient because taxpayers must divert time from other
activities in order to calculate their taxes (or earn the money to pay for
professional tax assistance) and because the government must maintain a
large agency to interpret these complex rules and to insure that taxes are
calculated correctly.
Moreover, complexity is inequitable because taxpayers with equal abilities
to pay may have different tax burdens because of their unequal abilities to
understand the tax rules; taxpayers with greater abilities to pay may not
bear an appropriately greater tax burden because of their greater
understanding of the rules. Finally, any tax which requires extensive
recordkeeping and perhaps professional tax assistance for ordinary citizens
cannot be described as simple.214

Prepaid tuition plans and many of the recently enacted Clinton education tax provisions
present a number of tax policy problems from a vertical equity standpoint. First, to the
extent that prepaid tuition plans operate under Section 529 to exempt from the purchaser's
income the annual build up of income, the benefit of the exemption increases with the
purchaser's marginal tax bracket. Thus, the benefit increases with the income of the
taxpayer. This is particularly problematic, given that the data tend to suggest that it is the
lower income and certain minority groups who are less to be able to save for college.
An additional vertical equity problem is presented by the President's education tax
provisions. The various incentives such as the Hope Scholarship Credit and Lifetime
Learning Credit are offset dollar for dollar by Federal education grants, such as Pell
Grants.215 Thus, to the extent that a student is receiving financial aid, he or she will be
entitled to less of a credit or deduction, or none at all. Because Pell Grants and other
federal financial aid are generally need-based,216 this will likely not assist lower-income
families and some middle-class families, leaving higher-income families as the more
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likely beneficiaries of the tax benefits (at least those whose ability to utilize the credits
are not phased out).
In addition to vertical equity issues, prepaid tuition plans also raise efficiency concerns.
Under Section 529, Qualified State Tuition Programs create an tax incentive for
purchasers to invest in the plans rather than in other non-tax favored investment vehicles.
Accordingly, taxpayers seem likely to make the investment, in part, because of the tax
advantage. Thus, the tax policy goal of efficiency appears to be violated. This seeming
violation of the efficiency criterion is perhaps justified by the governmental interest in
encouraging families to save for education. It is unclear, however, whether prepaid
tuition plans and the President's education tax provisions provide the best, most efficient,
source of governmental assistance.
Finally, the President's provisions present enormous simplicity concerns as well.
Educational institutions will be forced to undertake numerous administrative
responsibilities. For example, as originally proposed, eligibility of students for the tuition
tax credit requires that an eligible student maintain a B- average and be at least a halftime student.217
B. Education Policy Concerns
The Section 529 Qualified State Tuition Program provisions and the President's education
tax provisions raise numerous educational policy issues as well. One argument is that
much of the problem in paying for college education is the rising costs of the educational
institutions themselves and that increasing the amount of money available for tuition
simply will increase college tuitions. Neither Section 529 nor the President's proposals
address this problem.218
Another problem is reflected from using a specific level of grade, B-, to qualify for the
President's tuition tax credit. This raised the unappealing prospect of having the Treasury
promulgate regulations defining a B-.219 Moreover, such grade requirement might lead to
grade inflation as sympathetic (and perhaps self-interested) professors give the grade
necessary for students to receive the tuition tax credit as initially proposed.220 While the
requirement was ultimately dropped, it provides a meaningful illustration of a potentially
unwelcome intrusion of the tax law into educational policy. Similarly, those convicted of
drug felonies are precluded from using the credit.221
C. Targeting the Middle Class
Both Section 529 Qualified State Tuition Programs and the President's education tax
provisions clearly focus on providing benefits to the middle class. Prepaid tuition plans
tend to be unattractive to lower-income families because those families may be unlikely
to even save ahead for college. Moreover, those households are more likely to receive
need-based scholarships and financial aid to provide for educational expenses.222 Highincome taxpayers, on the other hand, are typically sophisticated investors, who will likely
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find that they are able to get far superior investment performance from other investment
vehicles.223
The President's tax provisions similarly focus on the middle class. As previously
discussed, the tuition tax credit and training deduction are reduced by financial aid, such
as Pell Grants, which tend to be need-based.224 The President's provisions also generally
phase out the deductions and credits at certain levels of adjusted gross income, therefore
eliminating high-income taxpayers.225 Thus, the voter-rich middle class are left as the
target of these provisions.
D. Risk and Return
By offering prepaid tuition plans, states are arguably entering into the investment
business. Guaranteeing a return on income in order to meet the tuition guarantee places
the state sponsors in a position to make risky investments in order to increase returns. To
the extent that the state stands behind the plan with its full faith and credit, paying off the
burden becomes the obligation of the population in general, causing further inequities as
lower income taxpayers pay off obligations of a plan that benefited higher income
taxpayers.
In addition, as previously discussed, prepaid tuition plans are generally not outstanding
investments, because they are designed to protect only against tuition increases and
inflation. Sophisticated taxpayers are likely to invest on their own and beat the return of
the prepaid plans.
In summary, prepaid tuition plans, and the President's education tax provisions are more
middle-class placebo than panacea. The provisions target the middle class with promised
tax benefits and investment returns. In so doing, the provisions do damage from a tax and
educational policy perspective.
VI. Conclusion
Paying for a college education is a serious problem for many Americans, not just those in
the middle class. Aid for higher education through the use of tax incentives has become a
political snowball.226 State prepaid tuition plans and the President's recently-enacted
education tax provisions are an example of such a snowball, and result in tax-policy
problems. For some time he momentum of state prepaid tuition plans was tempered by
uncertainty resulting from the questionable ruling by the Sixth Circuit in State of Mich. v.
United States and the indecisiveness by Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service as to
whether such plans are covered by the original issue discount rules. Unfortunately, the
President, IRS and Congress appear willing to trade additional policy problems in
exchange for certainty and political expediency.
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1 Tax Incentives for Education: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 100th Cong. 1 (1988) (statement of Committee Chairman Lloyd
Bentsen). While these comments were made eight years ago, their import
is as great today as they were then.
2 President's State of the Union Address, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
136 (Feb. 10, 1997). The State of the Union Address is also available
on the Internet at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/SOU97/>.
3 The most significant changes were the enactment of Section 529
Qualified State Tuition Programs, see infra notes 131-149 and
accompanying text, and President Clinton's education tax proposals, as
well as the changes as a result of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, see
infra notes 168-200 and accompanying text.
4 The "American Dream" would certainly include affordable and
accessible higher education, a house, and children who are better off
financially than their parents.
The prosperity that characterized the country until the middle 1970s
resulted in a rising economic tide that affected all boats. Regardless
of where they stood in the statistical income distribution, more and
more people felt themselves able to purchase what we think of as the
elements of a middle class lifestyle. These included houses, cars, and
many other consumer goods, as well as college education for their
children. JANET S. HANSEN, Introduction and Overview, COLLEGE SAVINGS
PLANS: PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES 2 (Janet S. Hansen ed. 1990) [hereinafter
COLLEGE SAVINGS PLANS].
Moreover, many aspects of the American dream in addition to higher
education are at risk. The "American dream" may sound vague and
grandiose, but it means something concrete and important to many
Americans. It means an economy in which people who work hard can get
ahead and each generation lives better than the last one. . . .
In recent years, the dream has been fading. Americans are worried about
their economic future--and they should be . . . . Young people look at
their job prospects and wonder whether they will do as well as their
parents or will be able to own a house. Parents worry about their
children's future. Many children face bleak futures: one in five now
lives in poverty. ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE
ECONOMY, THE STATES & THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1-2 (1992).
5 See GENERAL ACCT. OFF., HIGHER EDUCATION: TUITION INCREASING FASTER
THAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND PUBLIC COLLEGE COSTS 18 (1996) (noting that
during the school years from 1980-81 through 1994-95 public college
tuition has increased almost three times as much as increases in
household income and inflation) [hereinafter GAO Higher Education
Report]. ARTHUR M. HAUPTMAN & JAMIE P. MERISOTIS, THE COLLEGE TUITION
SPIRAL: AN EXAMINATION OF WHY CHARGES ARE INCREASING, A REPORT TO THE
COLLEGE BOARD AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (1990).
6 See generally ARTHUR M. HAUPTMAN, THE TUITION DILEMMA: ASSESSING NEW
WAYS TO PAY FOR COLLEGE (1990).
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7 The proposal initially provided for a $3,000 refundable tax credit-$1,500 in tax credits during the first two years of post-secondary
education as long as the student maintains a B average. John Godfrey,
Clinton Adds Tuition Tax Credit to Budget, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 5,
1996), available in LEXIS 96 TNT 110-5. The President again repeated
his proposal in his 1997 State of the Union Address. See State of the
Union Address, supra note 2 and accompanying text. The proposals were
then included in the budget negotiations in Congress and subsequently
enacted. See infra notes 168-200 and accompanying text.
8 There is substantial scholarship on prepaid tuition plans. See, e.g.,
PREPAID COLLEGE TUITION PLANS: PROMISE AND PROBLEMS (Michael A. Olivas
ed. 1993); Alan Gunn, Economic and Tax Aspects of Prepaid Tuition
Plans, 17 J.C. & U.L. 243 (1990); Jeffrey S. Lehman, Social
Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions, and Wealth Redistribution:
Lessons about Public Policy from a Prepaid Tuition Program, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1035 (1990); J. Timothy Philipps, Federal Taxation of Prepaid
College Tuition Plans, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291 (1990); J. Timothy
Philipps & Ed R. Haden, It's Not Love, But It's Not Bad: A Response to
Critics of a Prepaid Tuition Plans, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 281 (1992); Lee
A. Sheppard, State Tax Immunity and Middle Class Entitlements, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Dec. 13, 1994), available in LEXIS 94 TNT 243-15; David
Williams, II, Financing a College Education: A Taxing Dilemma, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 561 (1989).
9 Several members of Congress expressed a keen interest in prepaid
tuition plans and requested that the Government Accounting Office
("GAO") study the issue. See GAO PREPAID TUITION REPORT, infra note 52
and accompanying text.
10 State of Mich. v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994), rev'g
802 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
11 See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
110 Stat. 1755 (1996). Unless otherwise indicated, all Section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code"), as
amended.
12 The use of tax incentives for education is not a new idea. See e.g.,
Joe Thorndike, Tax History: Treasury's Case Against Education Tax
Breaks, TAX NOTES TODAY (Dec. 17, 1996), available in LEXIS 96 TNT 2444 (detailing the history of proposed education tax breaks and the
Treasury's opposition thereto); John K. McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition
Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowance for Personal Costs of
Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1972).
13 A relatively recent report reflected the congressional concern over
the rising costs of college:
During the 1980s, the cost of attending colleges of all kinds -- public
and private, 2-year as well as 4-year schools --has been going up
faster than inflation. In the 1989-90 academic year, average full-time
costs of attendance including room and board [was] $6,671 at public 4year schools and $14,326 at private 4-year schools. Some private 4-year
schools cost considerable more. While costs might not climb as rapidly
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in [the 1990s] as they did in the [1980s] some increases are expected.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS ISSUE BRIEF SAVING FOR COLLEGE 2
(1990) [hereinafter CRS REPORT ON SAVING FOR COLLEGE]. See also GAO
HIGHER EDUCATION REPORT, supra note 5.
14 Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro, KEEPING COLLEGE
AFFORDABLE--GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 5 (1991).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS--COLLEGE
COSTS: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COSTS AND SOURCES OF SUPPORT 19 (1988)
("In the American higher education system, the family has always been
the payor of first resort.")
19 CRS REPORT ON SAVING FOR COLLEGE, supra note 13, at 2.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 McPherson & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 2.
23 SANDY BAUM, The Need for College Savings, in COLLEGE SAVINGS PLANS,
supra note 4, at 8.
24 CRS REPORT ON SAVING FOR COLLEGE, supra note 13, at 3. Nevertheless,
there is some information concerning parent's savings from a 1983
survey:
-- nearly all were saving for some reason, but only half were currently
saving for college;
-- the median annual amount saved for college by parents who were
saving was $517;
-- saving for college began when children were young, though typically
more was saved as children approached college age; and
-- savings were greater the higher the parents' income: those with
household incomes under $10,000 saved a median of $120 a year; those
with incomes of $30,000 or more saved a median of $904 a year.
Id. (citing a nationally-representative survey commissioned by the
National Institute of Independent Colleges and Universities ("NIICU")).
25 Id. at 4.
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26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. See notes 48-49, infra, and accompanying text for a discussion
of tax issues relat-ing to home refinancing.
29 CRS REPORT ON SAVINGS FOR COLLEGE, supra note 13, at 4-5.
30 Id. at 5. "[O]f all households (regardless of age) with monthly
incomes under $900, the median net worth for whites was $8,443, for
Spanish origin people it was $453, and for blacks it was $88." Id.
(citing the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation ("SIPP")
conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Census).
31 Assume a taxpayer has $100,000 of taxable income with $20,000 in
deductions and is in a 30% marginal tax bracket. The $20,000 deduction
saves the taxpayer $6,000 in taxes, which is, in effect, a partial
subsidy to the taxpayer.
32 The 1997 Act tax provisions make a limited credit for educational
expenses available. See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
33 MARCUS SCHOENFELD, EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL EXPENSES--SECTION
162, 267-3d TAX. MGMT. (BNA) A-1 (1990).
34 I.R.C. § 262(a) (1997) ("[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in
this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses.").
35 I.R.C.§162(a) (1997) (generally allowing a deduction for ordinary
and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business).
36 I.R.C. § 263 (1997).
37 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) - (2) (as amended in 1967).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2) (as amended in 1967).
39 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (as amended in 1967).
40 Loretta Collins Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education
Expenditures: An Unfair Investment Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV.
621 (1990); David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing
an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
793 (1992); David S. Davenport, The 'Proper' Taxation of Human Capital,
TAX NOTES TODAY MAG. (Sept. 16, 1991), available in LEXIS 52 Tax Notes
1401; Clifford Gross, Tax Treatment of Education Expenses: Perspectives
from Normative Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 916 (1988). But, cf., Joseph
M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs--Or Why Costs of
Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized , 54 OHIO ST. L.
J. 927 (1993).
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41 See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
42 I.R.C. § 117(a) (1997).
43 Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63 (1991); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS - FEDERAL TAXATION OF STUDENT AID 2 (1994).
44 Id.
45 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶6.1, at 6-2 (2d ed. 1989).
46 Marci Kelly, Financing Higher Education: Federal Income Tax
Consequences, 17 J.C. & U.L. 307, 319 n. 67 (1991); CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, supra note 43.
47 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1997). See also Kelly, supra note 46, at 319.
48 I.R.C. § 163(h) (1997).
49 Kelly, supra note 46, at 319-20 (noting that Congress apparently
contemplated that refinancing proceeds would be used for financing
higher education).
50 See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
51 I.R.C. § 135 states:
INCOME FROM UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS USED TO PAY HIGHER EDUCATION
TUITION AND FEES
(a) GENERAL RULE.--In the case of an individual who pays qualified
higher education expenses during the taxable year, no amount shall be
includible in gross income by reason of the redemption during such year
of any qualified United States savings bond.
(b) LIMITATIONS.-(1) LIMITATION WHERE REDEMPTION PROCEEDS EXCEED HIGHER EDUCATION
EXPENSES.-(A) IN GENERAL.--IF-(i) the aggregate proceeds of qualified United States savings bonds
redeemed by the taxpayer during the taxable year exceed
(ii) the qualified higher education expenses paid by the taxpayer
during such taxable year,
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the amount excludable from gross income under subsection (a) shall not
exceed the applicable fraction of the amount excludable from gross
income under subsection (a) without regard to this subsection.
I.R.C. §135 (1997).
52 GENERAL ACCT. OFF., COLLEGE SAVINGS: INFORMATION ON STATE TUITION
PREPAYMENT PROGRAMS 20 (1995) [hereinafter GAO PREPAID TUITION REPORT].
53 Id. When the GAO Report was published in 1995 seven states had
prepaid tuition plans. Id. at 22. As of April 1997, fourteen states
have prepaid tuition plans (Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming). Mark Kantrowitz, Financial Aid
Info. Page, Prepaid Tuition Plans, (visited June 9, 1997)
<http://www.finaid.org.finaid/ptp.html>. Moreover, thirty-two states
are planning, developing, or at least considering prepaid tuition
plans. Those states are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. (visited Apr. 30, 1997).
54 GAO PREPAID TUITION REPORT, supra note 52, at 24. Wyoming, Florida
and Alabama follow the Michigan model. Id.
Ohio provides a slight variation under which the purchaser opens an
account with a minimum purchase and then purchases desired benefits by
the credit hour (or smaller unit). Alaska and Pennsylvania have
followed this approach. Id. at 25.
55 Id. at 24.
56 Id. at 25.
57 Id. Alaska and Pennsylvania follow this model. Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 The U. Plan boasts a wide variety of participating institutions,
public and private, rich and poor, rural and urban, large and small. As
of February 1996, the following seventy-five institutions were
participants in the plan: American International College, Amherst
College, Anna Maria College, Art Institute of Boston, Assumption
College, Babson College, Bay Path College, Bay State College, Berklee
College of Music, Berkshire Community College, Boston University,
Bradford College, Bridgewater State College, Bristol Community College,
Bunker Hill Community College, Cape Cod Community College, Clark
University, College of Our Lady of the Elms, College of the Holy Cross,
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Curry College, Dean College, Eastern Nazarene College, Endicott
College, Fitchburg State College, Framingham State College, Franklin
Institute of Boston, Gordon College, Greenfield Community College,
Hampshire College, Hebrew College, Hellenic College, Holyoke Community
College, Laboure College, Lasell College, Lesley College, Marian Court
College, Massachusetts Bay Community College, Massachusetts College of
Art, Massachusetts Maritime Academy, Massasoit Community College,
Merrimack College, Middlesex Community College, Montserrat College of
Art, Mount Holyoke College, Mount Wachusett Community College, Newbury
College, Nichols College, North Adams State College, North Shore
Community College, Northeastern University, Northern Essex Community
College, Pine Manor College, Quinsigamond Community College, Regis
College, Roxbury Community College, Salem State College, Simmons
College, Smith College, Springfield College, Stonehill College, Suffolk
University, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, University of
Massachusetts at Boston, University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth,
University of Massachusetts at Lowell, Wellesley College, Wentworth
Institute of Technology, Western New England College, Westfield State
College, Wheaton College, Wheelock College, Worcester Polytechnic
Institute, and Worcester State College. EXECUTIVE DEPT., COMMONWEALTH
OF MASS., U. PLAN: THE MASSACHUSETTS COLLEGE SAVINGS PROGRAM 10-12
(1996) [hereinafter U. PLAN OFFERING MATERIALS].
The U. Plan was the brainchild of Massachusetts' then Governor William
F. Weld. Ironically, Governor Weld's alma mater, Harvard University,
has chosen not to participate in the plan. Harvard's decision caused
Governor Weld to chide his alma mater. "Harvard, I hope you're
listening . . . . It's the least you could do. You cannot lose more
money in a year on this program than I've already given to Harvard
College. And if I took back all the Weld money retroactively to 1630,
Harvard would be bankrupt." Alice Dembner, State Savings Plan for
College Launched; Governor Urges Participation by State's Leading
Universities, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1994, at 35.
62 Jo-Ann Johnston, Find Out if the U.Plan is for You, State's Saving
Program One Way to Earmark Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1996, at 19.
63 Id.
64 U. PLAN OFFERING MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 14. MEFA maintains a
website at <http://www.mefa.org/index.html>.
65 U. PLAN OFFERING MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 14.
66 Johnston, supra note 62, at 20.
67 U. PLAN OFFERING MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 19.
68 Id. at 20.
69 See Johnston, supra note 62, at 20.
70 U. PLAN OFFERING MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 8.
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71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 17.
74 U. PLAN OFFERING MATERIALS, supra note 61, at 16.
75 As discussed, infra, notes 78-130 and accompanying text, when the
U.Plan was created, continuation of favorable tax treatment was far
from certain:
The most serious issue facing state tuition prepayment programs is the
potential applicability of federal tax provisions. Two potential taxes
are particularly troubling to program officials: (1) a tax on program
investment earnings, because that would make it more difficult for
programs to meet their future liabilities, and (2) an annual tax on
participants, because that would be unappealing to purchasers and an
administrative burden, according to program officials.
GAO PREPAID TUITION REPORT, supra note 52, at 93.
76 State of Mich. v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994), rev'g
802 F.Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
77 The Code is not explicit as to this issue. Rather, the Code only
applies to individuals, corporations, trusts, estates, etc. Moreover,
Congress has never intended that the Code apply to states. David M.
Richardson, Federal Income Taxation of States, 19 STETSON L. REV. 411
(1990).
78 I.R.C. § 115 provides in relevant part:
Gross income does not include-(1) income derived from . . . the exercise of any essential
governmental function and accruing to a State or any political
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia . . . .
I.R.C. § 115(1) (1997).
79 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts from the income:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual . . . .
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1997).
80 State of Mich. v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994), rev'g
802 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 1992); see Phillip Marchesiello, Federal
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Tax Immunity for State - Related Organizations: Michigan v. United
States, 49 TAX LAW. 429 (1996).
81 Id. at 817.
82 One commentator has suggested that the plan resulted from the thengovernor's attempt to "secure the votes of the always anxious middle
class." Sheppard, supra note 8.
83 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged"). As part of its mission,
Michigan maintains an "extensive system of public colleges and
universities." State of Mich., 40 F.3d at 820.
84 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 390.1425 § 5(1) (West 1997). The M.E.T. was
within the treasury department and was governed by an "independent
board" consisting of the state treasurer (ex officio) and eight other
members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate. State of
Mich., 40 F.3d at 818.
For a thorough discussion of the background behind the M.E.T. see Gunn,
supra note 8; Lehman, supra note 8; Philipps, supra note 8; and
Williams, supra note 8; Marchesiello, supra note 80.
85 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.1423 § 3 (West 1997).
86 State of Mich. v. United States, 40 F.3d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1994),
rev'g 802 F.Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
87 Id. at 820-21.
88 Id. at 821.
89 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.1433 § 13(4) (West 1997).
90 Id. at § 13(3).
91 State of Mich., 40 F.3d at 821.
92 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (June 24, 1988). The ruling also addressed
the federal estate and gift tax ramifications to the purchaser of the
contract. Id.
93 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (June 24, 1988) (citing Rev. Rul. 87-2,
1987-2 C.B. 18 which ruled that a lawyer's trust fund supervised and
controlled by a state's supreme court was not subject to federal income
tax because the fund was an integral part of a state or political
subdivision).
94 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (June 24, 1988).
95 State of Mich. v. United States, 40 F.3d 817, 821(6th Cir. 1994),
rev'g 802 F.Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
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96 Id. at 822.
97 State of Mich. v. United States, 802 F.Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
98 Id. at 121.
99 Id. at 126-27. These arguments were subsequently abandoned. State of
Mich., 40 F.3d at 822.
100 Id. at 127.
101 Id. at 123.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 124. Although there is some authority that I.R.C. § 115(1)
did not apply to the trust at all because it is neither a state or
political subdivision, the court acknowledged that §115 has been held
to have a broader scope. Id. (citing David Richardson, supra note 77,
at 503; Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp. v. United States, 308 F.
Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1970)).
104 Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
105 Id.
106 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) exempts from income tax:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare . . . and the net
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational,
or recreational purposes.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1997).
107 State of Mich., 802 F.Supp. at 125 (citations omitted).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 State of Mich. v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994), rev'g
802 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
111 Id. at 828-29.
112 Id. at 829.
113 Id. at 824.
114 I.R.C. § 103(a) (1997) ("gross income does not include interest on
any State or local bond"). State or local bond is defined as "an
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obligation of a state or political subdivision thereof." I.R.C. §
103(c)(1) (1997).
115 State of Mich., 40 F.3d at 825 (quoting 30 Op. Att'y. Gen. 252
(1914)).
116 Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998, 1004
(2d Cir. 1944)).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 818.
119 Id. at 830 (Guy, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting E.J. Dionne
Jr., Democrats Seek the Key to the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1989, § 4, at 5).
120 Id. at 830-31 (Guy, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
121 Id. at 833 (Guy, J. dissenting) (citing Rose v. Long Island R.R.
Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 918 (2d Cir. 1987)).
122 Id. (Guy, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Guy, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Guy, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Guy, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 834 (Guy, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Guy, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Guy, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S.
439 (1938)).
129 Id. (Guy, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 835 (Guy, J., dissenting).
131 Ellen P. Aprill, More Outrage at Michigan Education Trust Decision,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 4, 1995), available in LEXIS 95 TNT 2-94;
Sheppard, supra note 8; Marchesiello, supra note 80, at 439-41.
132 GAO PREPAID TUITION REPORT, supra note 52, at 98.
133 Id.
134 Rev. Proc. 96-34, 1996-26 I.R.B. 14.
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135 S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 106 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1474, 1580.
136 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110
Stat. 1755 (1996).
137 Section 1806(a) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
adding I.R.C. § 529(a), which provides as follows:
General Rule. A qualified State tuition program shall be exempt from
taxation under this subtitle. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence,
such program shall be subject to the taxes imposed by section 511
(relating to imposition of tax on unrelated business income of
charitable organizations).
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1806(a), 26 U.S.C. § 529(a)
(1997).
138 I.R.C. § 529(b)(1) (1997).
139 I.R.C. § 529(e)(3) (1997).
140 I.R.C. § 529(b)(2) (1997).
141 I.R.C. § 529(b)(5) (1997).
142 I.R.C. § 529(b)(6) (1997).
143 I.R.C. § 529(b)(4) (1997).
144 I.R.C. § 529(b)(7) (1997).
145 I.R.C. § 529(b)(3) (1997). The legislative history provides as
follows:
Earnings on an account may be refunded to a contributor or beneficiary,
but the State or instrumentality must impose a more than de minimis
monetary penalty unless the refund is (1) used for qualified higher
education expenses of the beneficiary, (2) made on account of the death
or disability of the beneficiary, or (3) made on account of a
scholarship received by the designated beneficiary to the extent the
amount refunded does not exceed the amount of the scholarship used for
higher education expenses.
S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 107 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1474, 1581.
146 I.R.C. § 529(d)(1) provides:
In General. If there is a distribution to any individual with respect
to an interest in a qualified State tuition program during any calendar
year, each officer or employee having control of the qualified State
tuition program or their designee shall make such reports as the
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Secretary may require regarding such distribution to the Secretary and
to the designated beneficiary or the individual to whom the
distribution was made. Any such report shall include such information
as the Secretary may prescribe.
I.R.C. § 529(d)(1) (1997).
147 I.R.C. § 529(c)(1) provides as follows:
In general. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no amount
shall be includible in gross income of-(A) a designated beneficiary under a qualified State tuition program,
or
(B) a contributor to such program on behalf of a designated
beneficiary, with respect to any distribution or earnings under such
program.
I.R.C. § 529(c)(1) (1997).
148 I.R.C. § 529(c)(2) (1997).
149 I.R.C. § 529(c)(3) (1997).
150 I.R.C. § 72(a)-(c) (1997).
151 The concept of time value of money is as follows:
The fundamental premise of the time value of money rules are: (1)
Parties dealing knowingly and rationally at arm's length provide
compensation for the use of money in every deferred payment transaction
and compute the amount of this compensation by the techniques of
interest compounding; (2) this compensation should be treated for tax
purposes as interest, taxable as ordinary income to the creditor and
deductible by the debtor, subject to the usual limitations on the
interest; and (3) this interest should be allocated among taxable years
by accruing interest at a rate that remains constant throughout an
instrument's term.
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS ¶ 56.2, at S56-4 to S56-5 (1996 cum. supp. #1).
152 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (1997).
153 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 151, ¶ 56.2, at S56-4.
154 Id. ¶ 56.2, at S56-5 n.3.
155 Id.
156 I.R.C. § 1272(a)(1) (1997).
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157 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1) (1997).
158 I.R.C. § 1273(b) (1997).
159 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(2) (1997).
160 See I.R.C. §1275(a)(1)(A) (1997).
161 Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(a) (as amended in 1997).
162 Debt Instruments with Original Issue Discount; Contingent Payments,
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